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Attended and unattended regions of the image array are viewed often as binary complements o one 
another, with a well-defined boundary between them. A simple experiment shows otherwise: if the 
contour of a simple convex shape is perturbed to create a distinctive texture, it is typically the 
outside of the contour that provides the basis for similarity judgement, not the inside. The 
introduction of the appropriate task, however, can make the inside part of the contour become 
more salient. A similar result occurs for concave shapes, such as a C, where notions of containment 
are not easily specified. These observations uggest hat figure boundaries are difficult to define 
objectively and that the setting of an attentional reference frame plays a key role in object 
description. We propose that this frame is part of a virtual, transparent blackboard or 
"clearboard", bound to the scene, not to the image. Copyright ©1996 Elsevier Science Ltd. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The natural world is usually conceived as being 
composed of different objects such as chairs, dogs or 
trees. This conception carries with it a notion that objects 
occupy a region of space, and consequently have an 
"inside". By default, things not within this region of 
space are considered "outside" the object. Thus, the 
lungs of a dog are inside the dog, but the chair occupies a
different region and is outside the object dog. When an 
object is projected into an image, these simple notions 
lead to what appears to be a clear disjunction between 
what is considered figure and what is ground. Custom- 
arily, the figure is seen as the inside of the imaged shape 
as defined by its bounding contours (i.e., its silhouette). 
The region outside this boundary is ground (Mumford et 
al., 1984). This implies that, at any given moment, the 
points of an image are either figure or ground. Such a 
view is reinforced by reversible figures, such as Rubin's 
vase-face or Escher's patterns of birds and fish. This 
view carries the notion that, at any instant, the figural 
region has a well-defined boundary. 
Here, we show that such a simple disjunctive 
distinction between figure and ground is incorrect. Before 
offering experimental observations, we would like to first 
point out that the assignment of a figural boundary to a 
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region of an image is an ill-posed problem. Conse- 
quently, if a figure has an ill-defined boundary, then it 
should not be surprising thai the attended image region 
may have fuzzy boundaries. 
The ambiguity in defining aprecise region of the image 
as the subject of attention arises in part because many 
objects in the world do not have clearly defined 
boundaries. These include fractal objects uch as clouds, 
fire and many particle systems. Although such objects 
occupy a region of space, the inside and outside regions 
of this space are uncertain. Even non-fractal objects 
present difficulties in defining clear bounding contours. 
For example, what is inside and what is outside of a fir 
tree? Does it include the region between the branches 
where birds might nest, or the air space between the 
needles? If we attempt to be quite literal, then perhaps 
only the solid parts define, the tree's exterior. Clearly, 
such a definition is not consistent with our conceptual 
view of the fir tree which includes roughly everything 
within its convex hull. One's intuition is that the bird is 
inside this convex hull, just as if it were contained within 
an escapable cage with the bars spaced too far apart. 
Clearly, issues of scale are critical to any formal 
definition of insideness. (For example, air might 
penetrate a piece of toast and hence lies inside, but 
whether any of the butter lies inside is less clear.) Our aim 
here is not to offer a definition of inside, but simply to 
point out that our own notions of insideness seem heavily 
dependent on inferring a boundary to objects. However, 
just how one should construct such boundaries i  not a 
well-defined procedure. The result will depend on the 
spatial scale chosen, as well as a smoothness constraint 
imposed on the object. However, the imposition of such 
1493 
1494 J.B. SUBIRANA-VILANOVA and W. RICHARDS 
FIGURE 1. Fir tree at several scales of resolution. What is inside the 
tree? 
a) b) c) 
FIGURE 2. The notion of "what is figure" does not require that he 
figure be a region enclosed by a visible contour. In(a), the x is seen to 
lie within the C, and is associated with the figure; whereas in(b), the x 
lies outside the figure. In (c), the answer isunclear. 
smoothing scales is largely subjective, typically depend- 
ing on the task at hand. 
Hence, if an object's boundary is ill-defined, it should 
not be surprising that the region of figural attention is 
also. In support of this conjecture, we present observa- 
tions which show that there are some regions of the 
figural image that are receiving more attention than 
others. Along the way, we use these demonstrations to 
clarify how figural assignments are given to image 
regions and how attentional reference frames are created 
in the process. The ambiguity of just what is considered 
inside a figure and just what is considered outside is 
highlighted. These results then lead us to review the 
notion of "hole", which is shown to be a concept ied to 
an attentional reference frame. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of our findings to visual and computational 
perception. We also introduce the notion of a frame curve 
to help explain how we might cope with the ambiguity of 
object boundaries. 
FUZZY BOUNDARIES 
Typically, figure-ground assignments are disjunctive, 
as in the bird/fish Escher drawings. However, as 
previously mentioned, when the image of a fractal-like 
object is considered, the exact boundary of the image 
shape is unclear and depends upon the scale used to 
analyze the image (Fig. 1). For the finest scale, perhaps 
the finest details are explicit, such as the needles of a 
spruce or the small holes through which a visual ray can 
pass unobstructed. However, at the coarsest scale, most 
fractal objects including trees will appear as a smooth, 
solid convex shape. Any definition of the region of 
attention and its frame must address this scale issue. 
Consider then, the following definitions. 
Definition 1 (Region of Attention) 
The region of attention is that collection of structures 
(not necessarily image-based) that currently are support- 
ing the analysis of a scene. 
Definition 2 (Attentional Frame) 
The attentional frame for a region under attention is a 
coordinate frame within which the attended structures 
can be organized. 
By these definitions, we mean to imply that the 
perceiver is trying to build or recover the description of 
an object (or scene) in the world, and his information- 
processing capability is focused on certain regions in the 
scene that are directly relevant o this task. [Here, we 
exclude explicitly image-based representations in favor 
of something like Marr's (1982) 2½ D Sketch.] The 
precise regions of the scene that are being analyzed, and 
their level of detail, will be set by the demands of the goal 
in mind. Such a definition implies that the regions of the 
scene assigned an attentional frame may not have a well- 
defined, visible contour. Indeed, by our definition, these 
regions could be disconnected and need not be spatially 
coherent! 
It has long been known that humans concentrate the 
processing of images in certain regions or structures of 
the visual array (e.g. Noton & Stark, 1971; van Voorhis & 
Hillyard, 1977). Attention has several forms: one of 
them, perhaps the most obvious, is gaze. We cannot 
explore a stationary scene by swinging our eyes past it in 
continuous movements. Instead, the eyes jump with a 
saccadic movement, come to rest momentarily and then 
jump to a new locus of interest (see Yarbus, 1967). These 
observations suggest he following. 
Claim 1 
The region of the image currently under directed 
attention may not have a well-defined boundary ear- 
marked by a visible image contour. 
In support of this claim, consider the C of Fig. 2. 
Although the image contour by itself is well defined, the 
region enclosed by the C is not. The region "enclosed" 
by the "C" is a legitimate processing chunk. For 
example, if one asks the question does the "X" lie inside 
the C, our immediate answer is yes for case (a) and no for 
case (b). To make this judgement, he visual system must 
evaluate the size of the interior egion of the C. Thus, by 
our definition, the concept "inside of C" must lead to an 
assignment of certain pixels of the display as the region 
of attention. Without an explicit contour in the image, 
however, where should one draw the boundary between 
the region under attention? For example, should we 
choose to close the attentional region with a straight line 
between the two endpoints? Another possibility would be 
to find a spline that completes the curve in such a way that 
the tangent at the two endpoints of the C is continuous for 
the complete figure. These findings agree with a model in 
which the boundary is something more closely approach- 
ing a "blurred" version of the C, as if a large Gaussian 
mask were imposed on a colored closed C. We contend 
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FIGURE 3. (Top row) Use the middle pattern as reference. Most see 
the left pattern as more similar to the reference. This could be because 
it has a smaller number of modified corners (with respect to the center) 
than the right one and, therefore, a pictorial match is better. (Second 
row) In this case, the left and right stars look equally similar to the 
center one. This seems natural if we consider that both have a similar 
number of corners moothed. (Third row) Most see the left pattern as 
more similar despite the fact that both left and right have the same 
number of smoothed corners with respect to the center star. Therefore, 
in order to explain these observations, one cannot base an argument on 
just the number of smoothed corners. The position of the smoothed 
corners needs to be taken into account, i.e., preferences are not based 
on just pictorial matches. Rather, here the convexities on the outside of 
the patterns eem to drive our similarity judgement. 
FIGURE 4. (Top) Reversible figure. (Second row) The contour (shown 
again in the center) that defined the previous reversible figure is 
modified in two similar ways (left and right contours). (Third and 
fourth rows) When such three contours are closed, a preference exists 
which depends for most on the side used to close the contour. Use the 
center shape as reference in both rows. As in the example of the 
previous figure, most favor the outer portions of the shape to judge 
similarity. A distance metric, based solely on a pictorial match which 
does not take into account the relative location of the different points of 
the shape, cannot account for these observations. 
that such "fuzzy" attentional boundaries occur not only 
within regions that are incompletely specified, such as 
that within the incomplete dosing of the C, but also 
within regions that appear more properly defined by 
explicit image contours. 
To further clarify our definition of the attentional 
region and its frame, note that it is not prescribed by the 
retinal image, but rather by the collection of image 
structures in view. Any pixel-based definition tied 
exclusively to the retinal image is inadequate, for it will 
not allow attentional (and processing) assertions to be 
made by a sequence of fixations of the object. Rather, a 
structure-based definition of an attentional frame pre- 
sumes that the observer is building a description of an 
object or event, perhaps by recovering object properties 
(Noton & Stark, 1971; Palmer, 1989). The support 
required to build these object properties i what we define 
as the attentional region. This support corresponds 
closely to Ullman's incremental representations (Ullman, 
1985) upon which visual routines may act, and conse- 
quently the operations involved in attentional assertions 
should include such procedures as indexing the sub- 
regions, marking these regions, and the setting of a 
coordinate frame (Palmer et al., 1988). We continue with 
some simple observations that bear on these problems. 
OUTSIDE IS MORE SALIENT THAN INSIDE 
When binary attentional ssignments are made for an 
image shape with a well-defined, simple closed contour, 
such as an "0",  the assignment is equivalent to 
partitioning the image into two regions, one lying inside 
the contour, the other outside. For such a simple shape as 
the "0" ,  the immediate intuition is that it is the inside the 
contour which is given the attentional assignment, and 
this does not include any of the outside of the contour. 
[See Hoffman & Richards (1984), for example, where 
shape descriptors depend on such a distinction.] By our 
definition, however, the attentional region might also 
include at the very least a small band or ribbon outside 
the contour, simply because contour analysis demands 
this. As a step toward testing this notion, namely that a 
ribbon along the outer boundary of the shape should also 
be included when attentional assignments are made, we 
perturb the contour to create simple textures, such as 
those illustrated in Fig. 3. 
In this figure, let the middle star pattern be your 
reference. Confirming our intuition, the top row shows 
that the greater the number of pointed comers, the more 
similar the star pattern to the reference. As corners are 
rounded, the patterns become less similar to the reference 
and more like each other. Hence, in the middle row, 
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FIGURE 5. (Left) Alligator image after processing to obtain a silhouette. (Center) Silhouette with frame curve superimposed, 
computed by a smoothing technique described elsewhere (Subirana-Vilanova, 1990, 1993). (Right) The regions outside the 
frame curve are now highlighted in black. Note that hese regions correspond closely to the salient parts. 
where each left and right pattern has an equal number of 
pointed and rounded corners, they appear similar to each 
other and different from the middle reference star. 
However, in the bottom row, again an equal number of 
corners have been rounded in the left and right patterns, 
yet now most observers will pick the left pattern as being 
most similar to the middle star.* The difference is simply 
that in the left pattern the intrusions have been smoothed, 
whereas in the right pattern it is the protrusions which are 
smooth. Clearly, the similarity judgement places more 
weight on the protrusions, which are seen as sharp convex 
angles in the reference pattern. The inner discrepancy is
almost neglected. 
The same conclusion is reached even when the contour 
has a more part-based flavor (Hoffman & Richards, 
1984), rather than being a contour texture, as in Fig. 4. 
Here, a rectangle has been modified to have only two 
protrusions. Again, subjects will base their similarity 
judgments on the shape of the convex portion of the 
protrusion, rather than the inner concavity. 
This result is not surprising if shape recognition is to 
make any use of the fact that most objects in nature can be 
decomposed into parts. The use of such a property should 
indeed place more emphasis upon the outer portions of 
the object silhouette, because it is here that the character 
of a part is generally determined, not by the nature of its 
attachment. Almost all attachments lead to concavities, 
such as when a stick is thrust into a marshmallow. Trying 
to classify a three-dimensional object by its attachments 
is usually misguided, not only because many different 
parts can have similar attachments, but also because the 
precise form of the attachments is not reliably visible in 
the image. Hence, the indexing of parts (or textures) for 
shape recognition can proceed more effectively by 
concentrating on the outer extremities (Kanizsa & 
Gerbino, 1967; Huttenlocher & Wayner, 1990). 
Another possible justification for such observations i
that, in tasks such as grasping or collision avoidance, the 
*The results are virtually independent of the viewing conditions. 
However, if the stars sustain an angle larger than 10 deg, the 
preferences may reverse. A detailed experiment has not been made 
and the observations of the reader will be relied upon to carry our 
argument. 
outer part is also more important and deserves more 
attention because it is the one that we are likely to 
encounter first. For example, in Fig. 3 (bottom), the 
center and left stars would "hurt" when grasped, whereas 
the right star would not, because it has a "smooth" 
outside. 
The outer region of a shape is thus more salient han its 
inner region. This implies that the region of scene pixels 
assigned to the attentional region places more weight on 
the outer, convex portions of the contour than on its 
interior concave elements (or to interior homogeneous 
regions) and leads to the following claim. 
Claim 2 
The human visual system assigns a non-binary 
attentional function to scene pixels, with greater weight 
given to regions near the outside of shapes, which 
become more salient. 
Note that this claim simply refers to "regions near the 
outside", not to whether the region is convex or concave. 
In Fig. 4, the outer portion of the protrusion contains a 
small concavity, which is presumably the basis for the 
figural comparison. 
Exactly what region of the contour is involved in this 
judgment is unclear and may depend upon the property 
being assessed. All we wish to claim at this point is that 
whatever this property, its principal region of support is 
the outer portion of the contour. The process of 
specifying just which image elements constitute this 
outer contour is still not clear, nor is the measure (nor 
weight) to be applied to these elements. One possibility is 
an insideness measure. Such a measure could be 
computed easily as a function of the distance of the 
image elements to the "smoothed" version of the contour 
(a circle in Fig. 3 and something close to a rectangle in 
Fig. 4). In this context, the smoothed contour corresponds 
to the notion of frame curves as used in Subirana- 
Vilanova (1991, 1993). 
This leads us to the following definition of frame curve 
which has to be read bearing in mind claim 1: 
Definition 3 (Frame Curve) 
A frame curve is a virtual image curve which lies along 
"the center" of the attentional region's boundary. 
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FIGURE 6. Star patterns with "holes" treat the inside ring of the shape 
as if this ring were an occluding shape, i.e., as if it were independent 
from the surrounding contours, even if one perceives a donut-like 
shape. 
In general, the frame curve can be computed by 
smoothing the silhouette of. the shape. This is not always 
a well-defined process, because the silhouette may be ill- 
defined or fragmented and because there is no known way 
of determining a unique scale at which to apply the 
smoothing. Figure 5 (center) shows a frame curve for an 
alligator computed using a scheme presented in detail 
elsewhere (Subirana-Vilanova, 1990, 1993). This frame 
curve is thus a simple first approximation to locating a 
boundary for the attentional region. On the right, the 
regions of the shape that are "outside" the frame curve 
have been colored; note that these regions do not intersect 
and they correspond closely to the outer portions of the 
different parts of the shape. As mentioned above (claim 
2), these outer portions are those more likely to be of 
immediate interest. 
INSIDE IS MORE SALIENT THAN OUTSIDE 
Consider once more the lower row of three-star 
patterns of Fig. 3. Imagine now that each of these 
patterns is expanded to occupy 20 deg of visual angle 
(roughly your hand at a distance of 30 cm). In this case, 
the inner protrusions may become more prominent and 
now the left pattern may be more similar to the middle 
reference pattern. (A similar effect can be obtained if one 
imagines trying to look through these patterns, as if in 
preparation for reaching an object through a hole or 
window.) Is this reversal of saliency simply due to a 
change in image size, or does the notion of a "hole" carry 
with it a special weighting function for attentional 
assignments? 
For example, perhaps by viewing the central region of 
any of the patterns of Fig. 3 as a "hole", the specification 
of what is outside the contour has been reversed. Claim 2 
would then continue to hold. However, now we require 
that pixel assignments to "the attentional region" be 
gated by a task-dependent, higher-level cognitive opera- 
tor which decides whether an image region should be 
regarded as an object "hole" or not. 
Again, with the middle pattern as reference, typically 
subjects will pick as most similar the adjacent pattern to 
the right. This is surprising, because these patterns 
generally are regarded as textured donuts, with the 
innermost region a hole. However, if this is the case and 
our previous claim is to hold, then the left pattern should 
have been most similar. The favored choice is thus where 
the inner star pattern were viewed as one object occluding 
another. Indeed, if we now force ourselves to take this 
view, ignoring the outer pattern, then the right patterns 
are again more similar, as in Fig. 3. So in either case, 
regardless of whether we view the combination as a donut 
with a hole, or as one shape occluding part of another, 
still we use the same portion of the inner contour to make 
our similarity judgment. The hole of the donut thus does 
not act like a hole. The only exception is when we 
explicitly try to put our hand through this donut hole. 
Then the innermost protrusions become more salient as 
previously described for "holes". These results lead to 
the following claim. 
Claim 2 (revisited) 
Once the attentional region and its frame are chosen 
then, depending on the task, a sign is given to radial 
vectors converging or diverging from the center of this 
frame (i.e., the focal point). If the vector is directed 
outward (as if an object representation is accessed), then 
the outer portion of the encountered contours is salient. If 
the vector is directed inward' to the focal point (as if a 
passageway is explored), then the inner portion of the 
contour becomes alient.* 
In the star patterns that we discussed earlier (see Fig. 
3), the attention was focused primarily on the stars as 
whole objects. That is, there is a center of the figure that 
appears as the "natural" place to begin to direct our 
attention. The default location of this center, which is to 
become the center of a local coordinate frame, seems to 
be, roughly, the center of gravity of the figure (Richards 
& Kaufman, 1969). Attention is then allowed to be 
directed to locations within this frame. Consider next the 
shapes hown at the top of Fig. 7. Each ribbon-like shape 
has one clear center on which we first focus our attention. 
So now let us bend each of the ribbons to create a new 
frame center which lies near the inner left edge of each 
figure (Fig. 7, bottom). Whereas, before, the left pattern 
was regarded as more similar to the middle reference, 
now the situation is starting to become confused. When 
the ribbons are finally closed to create the donuts of Fig. 
6, the favored similarity judgement is for the right 
pattern. The primary effect of bending and closing the 
ribbon seems to be a shift in the relation between the 
attentional frame and the contours. Following the center 
of gravity rule, eventually this center will move outside 
the original body of the ribbon. This suggests that the 
WHEN A HOLE IS NOT A HOLE 
Consider next the star patterns in Fig. 6, which consist 
of two superimposed convex shapes, one inside the other. 
*Typically, if the size of the contours i very small (in retinal terms) 
then the outside isalways more salient. But if the angular side is 
very large, the opposite becomes the default choice. 
















FIGURE 7. (Top) Using the middle shape as a reference, most see the 
left shape as more similar. (Bottom) If the same shape is bent, the 
situation becomes confused. 
judgments of texture similarity are dependent on the 
location of the attentional coordinate frame. 
Typically, as we move our gaze around the scene, the 
center of the coordinate frame will shift with respect o 
the imaged contours, thus altering the pixel assignments. 
A shift in the focus of attention without image move- 
ments can create an effect similar to altered gaze. More 
details regarding these proposed computations will be 
given in the next sections. What is important at the 
moment is that the saliency of attentional assignments 
will depend upon the position of the contour with respect 
to the location of the center of the attentional coordinate 
frame. The reader can test this effect himself by forcing 
his attention to lie either within or outside the boundary 
of the ribbons. Depending upon the position chosen, the 
similarity judgments change consistently with the revised 
version of Claim 2. This leads us to the last claim of the 
paper. 
Claim 3 
An attentional "coordinate" frame is imposed prior to 
constructing an object description for recognition. 
As in Jepson & Richards (1992), Subirana-Vilanova & 
Sung (1992) and Subirana-Vilanova (1993), we suggest 
that one of the most important roles of the attentional 
frame is to select and articulate the processing on the 
"relevant" structures of the image. The importance of 
selecting acoordinate frame early is to aid the indexing to 
a class of models (Corbalis, 1988; Humphreys, 1983; 
Jolicoeur, 1985). Indexing can be based on the coarse 
description of the shape that the frame can produce or on 
the image features associated with the frame, or on 
transformations intrinsic to or allowed within the 
particular frame (Palmer, 1985, 1989; Wiser, 1980). 
It is important to realize that as our gaze moves about 
the scene, the frame need not. In other words, we view the 
frame as bound to the scene, not t'o the image. It is as if 
there is a virtual, external transparent blackboard onto 
which we place the attentional coordinate frame and draw 
a frame curve [much like Ishii's (1994) clearboard]. If the 
frame moves, then so, consequently, will the assignment 
of scene pixels to (potentially) active image pixels. Our 
notion, then, is that the visual system first picks a (virtual) 
focal point in the scene, typically bounded by contours 
and, based on this focal point, defines the extent of the 
region (containing the focal point) to be included as the 
attended region. If all events in the selected region are 
treated as one object or a collection of superimposed 
objects, then the radially distant (convex) portions of the 
contours drive the similarity judgments and are weighted 
more heavily in the figural computations. On the other 
hand, if the choice is made to regard the focal point as a 
visual ray along which something must pass through 
(such as a judgment regarding the size of a hole), then the 
contours that lie radially the closest are given greater 
weight (i.e., those that were previously concave). This led 
us to the revised version of claim 2, namely that the 
attentional coordinate frame has associated with it either 
an inward or outward pointing vector that dictates which 
portion of a contour will be salient (i.e., outer vs inner). 
We have argued that the orientation of this vector is task- 
dependent. 
Here we must introduce a cautionary note. We do not 
propose that the attentional frame is imposed upon a 
three-dimensional structure seen as an object. Such a 
view would require that object recognition [or a 2~/2 D 
sketch (Marr, 1982)] had already taken place. Rather, our 
claim is that the attentional coordinate frame is imposed 
upon a (frontal plane) silhouette or region prior to 
recognition (see Claim 3) and is used to support the 
object recognition process, such as by indexing the image 
elements to a model. (Again, think in terms of an external 
virtual blackboard, or transparent "clearboard" onto 
which the visual machinery writes its assertions.) Hence, 
because acommitment is made to a coordinate frame and 
to the sign of its object-associated vectors (inward or 
outward), proper object recognition could be blocked if 
either the location of the frame or the sign of its radial 
vectors were chosen improperly. When a three-dimen- 
sional structure is obtained and analogous three-dimen- 
sional frames are imposed, similar claims are possible but 
they are not the subject of this section. 
WHAT IS AN ATrENTIONAL FRAME? 
Our least controversial c aim is that the image region 
taken as the attentional frame depends upon one's goal. 
Reversible illusory patterns, such as the bird/fish Escher 
drawings or Rubin's face-vase, support his claim. The 
more controversial claim is that the "image" region taken 
as attentionai region does not have a boundary that can be 
defined solely in terms of an image contour, even if we 
THE INSIDE--OIYI'SIDE DILEMMA 1499 
include virtual contours uch as those cognitive edges 
formed by the Kanizsa figures. The reason is two-fold: 
first, the focal position of our attentional coordinate frame 
with respect o the contours determines that part of the 
contour used in figural similarity judgments, implying 
that the region attended has changed or, at the very least, 
has been given altered weights. Second, whether the focal 
position is viewed as part of a passageway or alter- 
natively simply as a hole in an object affects the figural 
boundary. In each case, the region is understood to lie 
within an object, but the chosen task affects the details of 
the region being processed. This effect is also seen 
clearly in textured C-shaped patterns and becomes acute 
when one is asked to judge whether X lies inside the C, or 
if Y will fit into the C, etc. The virtual boundary assigned 
to close the C when making such judgments of necessity 
will also depend in part upon the size of the second 
object, Y. To assert simply that the attentional window is 
that region lying inside an image contour misses the point 
of what the visual information processor is up to. 
A simple experiment from the Rock laboratory 
demonstrates that the attentional window is not simply 
the entire region of the display, but rather a collection of 
scene elements. Some of the elements within this 
"attended" region may be ignored and, thus, may not 
be part of the structures at which higher level visual 
operations are currently being applied. Rock and Gutman 
(1983) showed two overlapping novel outline figures, one 
red and one green, for a brief period, e.g. 1 sec. Subjects 
were instructed to rate figures of a given color on the 
basis of how much they liked them (this attracts attention 
to one of the figures). Later they presented subjects with a 
new set of outline figures and asked subjects whether they 
had seen these figures in the previous phase of the 
experiment, regardless of their color. They found that 
subjects were very good at remembering the attended 
shapes but failed on the (overlapping) unattended ones. 
Although this experiment confounds memory for shapes 
with perceptual processing, the result suggests that the 
attended region is not simply a region of pixels, because 
the unattended figure was partly contained in an attended 
region and still did not support any high-level perceptual 
recall. Such operational definitions of "what is an 
attentional region?" thus seem fruitful ways of exploring 
how images are interpreted. Our definition is in this spirit 
and leads to a different view of the initial steps involved 
in the processing of visual images than those now in 
vogue in computational vision. This is the subject of the 
next two sections. 
F IGU~ROUND AND ATrENTIONAL FRAMES 
In classical perceptual psychology, "figure" has a 
well-defined meaning that is most closely associated with 
those image regions defined by "occluding" (as opposed 
to ground, which corresponds to a "partly occluded 
surface"). Therefore, the classical definition of figure (vs 
ground) is in terms of three properties: (1) it is perceived 
as closer to the observer; (2) it has the shape defined by 
the bounding contour; and (3) it occludes the ground.* 
Our latest claim introduces a complementary, mutually 
exclusive state to the attentional frame within which 
figural processing is presumed to occur. When the 
attentional vector is pointing outward, as in "object 
mode", this implies that the contour egions associated 
with the inward state of this vector should be assigned to 
a separate state. 
Consider the following experiment of Rock and 
Sigman (1973), in which they showed a dot moving up 
and down behind a slit or opening, as if a sinusoidal curve 
were being translated behind it. The experiments were 
performed with slits of different shapes, so that in some 
cases the slit was perceived as an occluded surface and in 
others as an occluding one. They found that the 
perception of the curve is achieved only if the slit is 
perceived as an occluded region and not when it is 
perceived as an occluding region. Using their terms, the 
"correct" perception is achieved only if the slit is part of 
ground but not when it is part of the figure. Using our 
terms, the attentional window has not changed but rather 
its attributes have, because the slit was viewed as a 
passageway between objects and not as an object with a 
hole. Note the difference between ground and attentional 
region. 
In support of our view, another experiment by Rock 
and Gilchrist (1975) shows that the attentional window 
need not correspond to the occluding surface. In this 
second experiment, they showed ahorizontal line moving 
up and down with one end remaining in contact with one 
side of an outline figure of a face. Consequently, the line 
in the display changes in length. When the line is on the 
inside of the face, most observers ee it changing size, 
adapting to the outline; while when it is on the outer side 
o f  the contour, it is seen with constant length, but 
occluded by the face. This has been described as a 
situation in which no figure-ground reversal occurs. 
However, in our terms, the attentional window has 
changed, because the attended region changes. In the first 
case, the region of attention corresponds tothe occluding 
surface and in the second, to the occluded one. Thus, the 
attentional window need not correspond to the occluding 
surface, even when the surfaces that are occluded are 
known. 
Our point is that the attentional frame and its subsumed 
region need not meet the classical criteria set out for the 
definition of figure (vs ground). To push this distinction 
between figure and frame still further, consider a 
figure-ground assignment in a situation where you are 
looking at the edge between two objects that do not 
occlude each other. For example, the grass in the border 
of a frozen lake or the edge of your car's door. What is 
ground in this case? Clearly, in these examples, there is 
not a well-defined foreground and background. Is figure 
the grass or is it the lake? These examples have been 
chosen carefully so that depth relations are unclear 
between objects. In these situations one simply cannot 
*S. Palmer pointed out to us the importance of the classical definition 
of figure/ground. 
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assign figure-ground. What is puzzling is that the number 
of occasions where this happens is very abundant: a bottle 
and a cap, objects in abstract paintings, the loops of a 
metallic chain, etc. Yet, our proposal on attentional 
reference frames does not encounter difficulties with 
these situations, since depth, like object boundaries, is 
treated as a figure-ground attribute which need not be 
well defined in all cases. Depth measures, just like 
boundary measures, can be fuzzy. Therefore, to us, 
figure-ground and attentional frames are quite different 
concepts. 
WHAT IS NEW 
The fact that figure and ground reversals are attention 
related has been known for some time (Rubin, 1921).* 
However, there appears to be no precise statement of the 
relation between "figure" and notions of "inside" and 
"object". Nor has it been noted previously that, typically, 
it is the convex portions of image structures that support 
image analysis, with contour saliency changing when the 
task is changed, such as viewing a region as something to 
pass through, rather than as a shape to be recognised.t 
These new observations upport an operational defini- 
tion of reference frames which are attention-dependent. 
These frames are scene-based, not image-based, as if one 
were writing upon an external clearboard. We argue that 
it is the processing focus, not an image region typically 
defined as "figure", that provides the key ingredient to 
constructing figural boundaries. This processing focus 
has a non-discrete fuzzy boundary and should not be tied 
directly to an image contour. This leads to the concept of 
virtual frame curve which can be used for shape 
segmentation i  conjunction with inside/outside rela- 
tions. These latter relations, in turn, have been shown to 
be dictated in part by task-dependent factors which set the 
sign of the principal direction assigned to the coordinate 
frame tied to the frame curve (i.e., inwards vs outwards). 
We propose that such frames are set prior to recognition, 
which typically proceeds by the successive processing of 
convex chunks of image structures lying outside the 
frame curve. 
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